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In September 2011, scientists announced new experimental find-
ings that would not only threaten the conduct and publication
of influenza research, but would have significant policy and intel-
ligence implications. The findings presented a modified variant
of the H5N1 avian influenza virus (hereafter referred to as the
H5N1 virus) that was transmissible via aerosol between ferrets
(1, 2). These results suggested a worrisome possibility: the exis-
tence of a new airborne and highly lethal H5N1 virus that could
cause a deadly global pandemic. In response, a series of interna-
tional discussions on the nature of dual-use life science arose (3).
More proposed “gain-of-function (GOF)” research on the flu, and
other respiratory viruses such as severe acquired respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) and middle east coronavirus (MERS-CoV), has led
to this work being labeled as having “potential pandemic potential
(PPP).”
Scientists and other interested parties are increasingly asked to
more clearly state the risks and benefits of this kind of research and
whether new regulations and oversight mechanisms are needed.
More recently, controversies such as reported accidents and lax
controls over dangerous pathogens in high profile research labs
have once again raised the issue of accounting and safeguards of
dangerous pathogens, with new calls for greater transparency of
the oversight of these materials (4, 5). The emerging field of syn-
thetic biology is also raising concerns about its current and future
impact on human health and the environment, and its poten-
tial for bioterrorism by do-it-yourself biologists. With the Ebola
outbreaks happening as we began to work this editorial, we have
encountered additional (but fairly speculative!) discussion about
the threat of bioterrorism during naturally occurring outbreaks
and how this risk could be dealt with by the health security agenda.
Regardless of where one finds oneself on the topic, it seems
clear that advances in the life sciences are creating new ethical,
safety, regulatory, and security challenges. To what extent such
research should be conducted, published, and governed? Who
should have a say in these outcomes? What viable alternatives exist?
Since 2001, there have a variety of national and global initiatives
to increase biosecurity, while not unduly inhibiting responsible
scientific innovation. Various countries are continuing to develop
or revamp their biosecurity regimes. The traditional “bottom up”
approach of scientist self-governance for biosecurity is increas-
ingly in question, but controversial changes to the National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity in the United States indicate that
top-down approaches are also not a panacea.
This special issue was devoted to contributions that explored
this matrix of issues from a variety of case study and interna-
tional perspectives. This issue was a challenge to manage because
of the rapidly evolving nature of developments in the field even
from when we first issued the call for papers in December 2013.
Emblematic of the topic itself, this made it difficult to draw a line
on what to include in the issue as new submissions were entered
and new controversies arose. The debate and discussion over the
dual-use implications of emerging infectious diseases and the life
sciences continues and will continue in the foreseeable future. We
thank the authors of this special issue for an excellent set of papers
to starting framing and prioritizing the national and international
dialog on these timely issues.
The articles in this issue ultimately clustered around five cen-
tral themes: (1) dual-use as a unique kind of policy problem; (2)
involving diverse stakeholders in dual-use discussions; (3) insti-
tuting a culture of responsibility among scientists; (4) producing
more evidence-based risk-benefit analyses of dual-use research;
and (5) developing greater oversight, control, and standardization
of dual-use procedures.
For the first theme, Rappert (6) noted that dual-use has been a
largely“non-problem”– a curious phenomenon. Rappert (6) notes
that although much concern has been cited with the misuse of the
life sciences since September 11, there have been very few research
identified as “of concern.” Moreover, Jefferson and colleagues (7)
find that there has been a lot of mythmaking around synthetic
biology that has been used to mobilize support, resources, and
action for focusing policy attention on this field. Koblentz (8),
however, finds that dual-use is an inherently “wicked problem”
that makes it resistant to long-lasting solutions. In contrast, Mur-
dock and Koepsell (9) argue that dual-use research is a classical
principal-agent problem and that this kind of asymmetry between
governments and scientists, creates the tensions that we see in
regulation.
Connecting to the second theme, Suk et al. (10) argue that the
public health sector could be brought in more to dual-use dis-
cussion to help guide policy decisions and promote actions along
all phases of the research cycle. To date, the authors find that
public health perspectives have been an underutilized resource in
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dual-use/biosecurity discussions. Kosal (11) argues more dramat-
ically that improving public health could serve as a powerful active
deterrent to those who might wish to launch a bioterrorist attack.
Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity are closely intertwined
concepts, both dependent on compliance with appropriate regu-
lations, laws, and oversight mechanisms. In both, there is no such
thing as “zero risk.” As concerns biosafety, it is important to note
that safety consists not simply of the design of laboratories, but
also crucially in the trained people that work there, the implemen-
tation of regulations, and the use of robust risk-based approaches
to mitigate adverse events. In the third theme cutting cross the
papers, Jacobsen et al. (12) and Sijnesael et al. (13) argue that
we need to internally cultivate responsibility within specific orga-
nizations that handle dangerous pathogens, as well as the larger
life science community. These authors also argue that we need
a more diverse set of stakeholders in discussions about dual-use
issues and in the development and implementation of new over-
sight and assessment measures. Further, Jacobsen et al. (12) as well
as Klotz and Sylvester (14) both argue that we need more quan-
titative and qualitative risk-benefit analyses for assessing research
with dual-use potential. In the area of governance, Smith and Scott
(15), as well as Lev and Samimian-Darash (16), Ehrlich (17), and
Jacobsen et al. (12) all advocate for the need for new oversight
and governance structures for research and funding of dual-use
science.
In sum, what we see from these papers and continuing media
coverage is that the debate of dual-use is growing, gaining more
public, expert, and policy attention. But as the papers in this
issue suggest, these debates need to happen at higher policy lev-
els. Moreover, there is the need for more inculcation of scientific
responsibility and norms at the local, national, and global level.
Countries need to continue to work on improving their biose-
curity efforts and develop some key indicators to not only show
that they are committed to biosecurity and biosafety, but they are
implementing, monitoring, and assessing key aspects at the local
and national level. This needs to include not only academic and
government research institutions, but also those in the private
sector. Within this context, the underlying objective should be,
ultimately, to improve and not threaten public health, but exactly
how to do this is remains an outstanding and elusive question.
Finally, we need more review and accounting both nationally and
globally about what biosecurity measures are in place, what gaps
still exist, and how to remedy these shortcomings.
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